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Informal Imperialism and the 1879 Hesperia Incident: 
Containing Cholera and Challenging Extraterritoriality
in Japan
Harald FUESS
Informal empire is a classical term of diplomatic history to designate the 
British role in East Asia after the Opium Wars. This paper looks at informal 
imperialism more broadly to question the interaction of foreign powers and 
their citizens with and within Japan. It argues for a contested complexity 
of the extraterritorial arrangements such that Japanese independence was 
not only advocated against foreign imperialism but partly with the support 
of imperial powers and their nationals, according to international legal and 
political norms prior to the popular Japanese treaty revision movement of the 
1880s and early 1890s. On 15 July 1879, the German government ordered 
the merchant ship Hesperia to break Japanese quarantine regulations and 
enter the port of Yokohama. This action resulted in furious Japanese and 
international condemnation. Some scholars claim the deed transmitted 
cholera to Japan and led to over 100,000 deaths in 1879 alone. What 
is beyond dispute is that the event ignited a fierce debate on Western 
extraterritoriality in Japan and abroad, renewed calls for a renegotiation of 
the international treaties and led to a reorganization of the Japanese maritime 
quarantine system. While today the “Hesperia incident” has been forgotten, it 
revealed significant disagreements on the nature of extraterritoriality among 
the various powers and different international approaches to combating 
epidemic disease. Most importantly, it questions the common vision of a 
united front of Western imperialists enforcing their interpretation of “unequal 
treaties” on a defenseless Japan.
Keywords: imperialism, Meiji Japan, international law, diplomatic history, 
maritime quarantine regulations, public health, treaty ports, Japan-foreign 
relations-U.K.-U.S.-Germany
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Figure 1. Illustrated narrative on preventing cholera Korori fusegi no etoki (1877) by 
Taiso Yoshitoshi 大蘇芳年 [月岡芳年]  (1839–92). Source: UC San Francisco Japanese 
Woodblock Print Collection.1
“SIR: It is a relief to be able to say that from all advices the Asiatic cholera has happily 
disappeared from Japan. … It would seem from the results of the efforts of the health 
boards of this city of a million of people, that the Asiatic cholera may be arrested by the 
prompt and liberal use of such disinfectants as carbolic acid; and by a careful regimen, 
thorough cleanliness, and the prompt removal of all impure matter from the vicinity of 
dwellings.” John Bingham, U.S. Minister to Japan, 15 November 18772
Introduction: Informal Imperialism
William G. Beasley employed the term “informal empire” to characterize the international 
order Great Britain created in East Asia after the first Opium War with China (1839–42) 
and to which Japan belonged via “the treaty port system.” Drawing on the seminal work by 
Robinson and Gallagher, who showed how the ideology of “free trade” was a core justifica-
tion for “informal empire.” Formal legal procedures such as treaties and contracts served 
to promote and protect British trade and political interests in East Asia and Latin America 
without the necessity of large-scale territorial control implicit in colonies or protectorates as 
* I would like to thank Martin Dusinberre, David Mervart and Sven Saaler for comments on a draft version as 
well as John Breen for encouraging a deeper exploration of the Hesperia story in the first instance.
1 UCSF Website Laura W. Allen: “The liquid is carbolic acid, or phenol, which was a disinfectant considered 
effective in warding off the disease. In a print from 1877, this f luid is unleashed upon a sword-wielding demon 
by the ‘prevention squad,’ a crowd of soldiers in Western-style uniforms.” Other references date this print to 
1883.
2 FRUS, 1877, pp. 481–82.
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in South Asia or Africa.3 Nevertheless, “informal imperialism” operated with the application 
or the threat of powerful “gunboat diplomacy,” in maintaining an asymmetrical relationship 
of power legitimized by international law. One of the key features of informal imperialism 
was extraterritoriality, namely the principle that each Western treaty power individual 
had the right to be judged by the civil and criminal laws and legal institutions of his own 
country. This principle was usually not reciprocal. Subjects of East Asian countries still fell 
under the jurisdiction of the respective national laws when in Europe or the Americas. Not 
surprisingly, scholars and the public in Japan still today refer to this arrangement as “the 
East Asian unequal treaty system” (higashi Ajia ni okeru fubyōdō jōyaku taisei 東アジアにおけ
る不平等条約体制).4 The international agreements Japan concluded after 1858 with sixteen 
countries usually contained the four elements of informal imperialism: extraterritoriality, 
designated treaty ports, low and fixed external tariffs as well as the most-favored nation 
clause that gave each power the same privileges negotiated by any other foreign power.5 
After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the new Japanese leadership used the revision of the 
“unequal treaties” as a key political leitmotif, especially after 1872 when according to a 
clause in various treaties revision became legally possible.6 The desire to renegotiate the 
treaties served as the core motivation for the famous Iwakura mission to the United States 
and Europe in 1871–73.7 Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具視 (1825–83), who was such an over 
arching figure that diplomatic historian Ian Nish named the entire period of foreign relation 
1869–83 after him, wrote about his foreign policy goals in April 1869:
We must guard our country’s independence … when foreigners who live in our country 
violate our laws, we are forced to stand by while agents of their governments exercise 
jurisdiction over them. Our country has never before known such shame and disgrace.8
Nevertheless, the treaties remained valid until the end of the nineteenth century with extra-
territoriality finally lifted in July 1899 and Japan regaining its full tariff autonomy by 1911. 
Japan was thereby the first country in East Asia to obtain full legal sovereignty and indepen-
dence. Informal Western imperialism developed in different directions elsewhere. Western 
treaties with Korea were terminated in August 1910 by Japanese annexation. Some Western 
treaties with China became obsolete with World War I, while others existed until World War 
II when informal Western imperialism in East Asia came to an end after a century.9
Most research on imperialism and extraterritoriality in Japan has so far focused either 
on the eye-catching initial rounds of treaty negotiation in the early years, or on the later 
period when diplomacy was closely linked to such domestic politics issues as drafting the 
Constitution and opening the Diet in 1890.10 During that politically tumultuous decade of 
  3 “Informal empire” coined in Robinson and Gallagher 1953; Beasley 1987, pp. 1–26. For other scholars using 
these terms for East Asia, see Osterhammel 1986; Duus 1989, pp. xiv–xvi.
  4 Ino’o 1995.
  5 Chang 1984, p. 4.
  6 Ikeda 1997, pp. 191–92.
  7 Mayo 1961.
  8 Quote from Iwakura kō jikki in Nish 1977, p. 12.
  9 Whereas Japan introduced the new legal principle that all subjects are equal under the law, Western 
extraterritoriality was compatible with the Chinese legal system that distinguished between Manchu and 
Chinese (Cassel 2012).
10 Auslin 2004; Kleinschmidt 2007; Beasley 1989; Han 2013.
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the 1880s, governments fell and several foreign ministers, Inoue Kaoru 井上馨 (1879–87) and 
Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信 (1888–89), resigned because they could not reach an agreement 
acceptable to foreign powers, their own government peers and the Japanese public. As late as 
the 1894 elections, treaty revision was a major issue of domestic contestation.11 Scholars have 
pointed out how treaty revision united both conservative and liberal critics of the Japanese 
government, while also galvanizing intellectuals to speak of a common national identity.12
We know rather little of Japan’s attitudes to Europe and the United States during the 
“middle years” of the extraterritorial regime—the late 1870s. Standard historical narratives 
in English often jump from 1872 to the late 1880s. The 1870s then become characterized by 
international Japanese self-restraint. The Japanese government decided not to attack Korea 
despite the advocacy of a strong leadership faction. The Taiwan expedition in 1874 led to 
Chinese legal recognition of Japanese control of the Ryūkyū Islands. The 1876 “opening” of 
Korea through the Ganghwa treaty furthermore showed how Japan could successfully apply 
the international logic of informal imperialism to others. Moreover, sweeping domestic re-
forms led to centralization and consolidation of power in Tokyo, especially after the Satsuma 
rebellion of 1877. Western imperial retrenchment, where it happened, such as the recall of 
British and French troops from Yokohama in 1875, appeared to be more the result of a drive 
to reduce military expenditures than a major change in Japan’s foreign relations.13  In short, 
one may conclude that in the 1870s the Meiji government was so occupied with domestic 
reforms in pursuit of “a wealthy country and a strong military” ( fukoku kyōhei 富国強兵) that 
it was not seeking to upset Western powers by openly and forcefully challenging its place in 
the international imperialistic legal order.
Western imperialism in the 1870s also appeared less of a bête noire to Japanese politicians 
than it had during the late Edo period when many of them had plotted to “expel the barbarian 
and honor the emperor.” In the 1870s, treaty revision seemed also less central compared to 
the late 1880s when, despite censorship, Japanese press reports often criticized the treaties. 
Japanese officials heard over again and again the Western mantra: modernize your form of 
governance and reform your legal and penal system so we can entrust you with jurisdiction 
over our nationals. In return, the Japanese side refused to give in to Western wishes for the 
full opening of the country to foreign commerce and business opportunities. The “Normanton 
incident” symbolized the perceived injustice of the system to Japanese. It involved a British 
court in Kobe exonerating Captain Drake of the Normanton of responsibility for an incident 
in October 1886 when European crewmembers rescued themselves from the sinking ship, 
leaving all Japanese passengers to drown.14
The “Hesperia incident,” by contrast, is a forgotten event that took place in 1879, a 
year almost equidistant between the start and end of extraterritoriality in Japan. It brings 
into relief the diplomatic and public debates, and proves that their main lines of criticism, 
resentment and reinterpretation did not always follow the formula of Japan against the 
rest of the world. Rather, it becomes clear there existed a multi-lingual, cross-cultural 
dialogue, surprising given the non possumus (we can not do it) stance adopted by British 
11 Cullen 2003, pp. 205–207.
12 Pyle 1969, especially chapter “Treaty Revision and Self-Determination.”
13 Sims 1998, pp. 93–96.
14 Chang 1984, pp. 81–98.
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diplomats.15 Here we explore two aspects of the Hesperia incident in more detail to place the 
controversy in the history of Japan and informal imperialism: (1) international and domestic 
understanding of cholera and public health; (2) the diplomatic and political context of 
debates on extraterritoriality, treaty revision and sovereignty. Let us now first turn to the key 
“protagonist” of our story: A ship.
The “Hesperia Incident”: The Controversy and the Historical Event
“Hesperia Outrage” was the headline of the Tokio Times on 9 August 1879. Edward House 
(1836–1901), the American editor of the newspaper, blamed the German merchant steam-
ship Hesperia for “defying and disregarding” Japanese law and accused German diplomats 
of “insult and injury inflicted upon the dignity and the honor of the empire.”16 Such ranting 
by the Tokio Times, known to be a state-financed pro-Japanese and anti-British newspaper 
in English, may not come as a surprise, but even the more moderate Japan Weekly Mail 
expressed its indignation.17 It claimed “few acts since the opening of the ports have caused 
a greater feeling of irritation among them than the proceedings connected with this vessel.” 
It then wrote of the “bitterness and ill-feeling” created by the German decision, which 
“is worse than a crime, it is a blunder.”18 The French Courier du Japon lamented “the sad 
impression to the Japanese of how foreigners understand justice.” It argued that in case of 
“force majeure” and “for the general interest” even “open ports” should be closed.19 Japanese 
newspapers also criticized the deeds of the Hesperia. The Yūbin hōchi shinbun spoke of a 
“violent act” (sobō no kōi 粗暴ノ行為); the Tōkyō nichinichi shinbun, the Asahi shinbun and 
the Yomiuri shinbun devoted a series of articles to it,20 and compared the event to a warship 
entering a foreign harbor “bombarding people and houses” ( jinka o hōgeki suru 人家ヲ砲撃
スル). The news spread internationally, first to the United States, then to Europe. The New 
York Times derided European “arrogance” and “bomb-shell diplomacy,”21 The German-
language press in New York carried the headlines “Japan is angry” for an “irrelevant and 
false diplomatic principle” “letting loose the epidemic” on Japan.22 The Times of London 
published an article referring to a “high-handed performance” that “might endanger the 
lives of millions of people.”23 Another article in the Times asserted, “No good whatever can 
result … from oppressing and alienating Japan.”24 The renowned Hamburgischer Correspondent 
reported its news from San Francisco about the German-Japanese conflict nearly escalating 
into “violence” and asserting “Eisendecher raped Japan in an outrageous way.”25 A leading 
German daily, the Frankfurter Zeitung, concluded that, due to the “Hesperia Affair,” the 
15 “Non Possumus,” Tokio Times, 22 December 1877.
16 House 1879b.
17 On the Tokio Times, Huffman 2003, pp. 117–52; Fält 1990, p. 21.
18 “The Quarantine Laws and the Hesperia,” Japan Weekly Mail, 19 July 1879, pp. 920–22.
19 Courier du Japon, 16 July 1879.
20 “Shasetsu: Doitsu-sen waga ken’ekihō o warite nyūkō seri” 社説: 独逸船我検疫法ヲ破リテ入港セリ. Yūbin 
hōchi shinbun, 26 July 1879; “Shasetsu: Geruman sen Hesuperia gō ihan no tenmatsu” 社説: 日耳曼船ヘスペ
リア号違犯ノ顛末. Tōkyō nichi nichi shinbun, 28 July 1879.
21 New York Times, 4 August 1879.
22 New Yorker Zeitung, 28 August 1879.
23 Iriye 1879.
24 Reed 1879.
25 Hamburgischer Correspondent, 24–25 September 1879.
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German Minister Karl von Eisendecher (1841–1934) should be recalled since he “is hated 
in all Japanese circles.”26 The “Hesperia incident” or Hesuperia gō jiken ヘスぺリア号事
件, as it is known in Japanese scholarship today, became such an emotional issue in Japan 
and abroad because it looked as if German diplomats callously defied Japanese quarantine 
regulations, thus threatening both the Japanese population and the local foreign community 
with cholera.27
Americans have been partly responsible for the view that the German Hesperia 
deliberately transported cholera to Yokohama.28 According to eminent American diplomatic 
historian Payson Treat, it caused “a total of death far surpassing those of American soldiers 
in the [First] World War.”29 Such an assessment derives from two authoritative American 
voices of the time. John Bingham, United States Minister to Japan from 1873 to 1885, 
was the strongest proponent of this persuasion in his multiple reports home. Bingham 
claimed the resistance of “certain foreign powers” spread the contagion, whereas the United 
States cooperated with the Japanese authorities.30 Indeed America was the first nation to 
implement Japanese quarantine regulations without any amendments or caveats. Prominent 
notices in newspapers to “Officers of all Naval and Merchant Vessels of the United States 
of America” threatened them with the sanctions of the “United States Consular Court in 
Japan” in case of non-compliance.31 Most famous is the enraged response of the civil war 
hero and former American president General Ulysses Grant, whose visit to Japan from 21 
June 1879 to 2 September 1879 was well received.32 Grant’s recommendation that Japan 
should sink the German ship was widely reported in the international press.33 Grant’s 
remarks remain influential in diplomatic histories today.34 According to the official narrative 
of his world tour, he was propagating the image of the United States as the main Western 
friend of Japan. In conversation with Itō Hirobumi 伊藤博文 and  Saigō Tsugumichi 西郷
従道 on 22 July 1879 in Nikkō, he is said to have emphasized that Germans deliberately 
violated Japanese laws by “sending down a German gun-boat and taking a German 
merchantman out of quarantine. No European power would dare to do such a thing in the 
United States. But it illustrates European policy in the East.”35 The political authority of the 
two Americans affirmed Japanese views that injustice had been done. Grant and Bingham 
(whom Grant had appointed Minister to Japan) presented themselves as representatives of a 
disinterested foreign power warning Japan of European, especially British ambitions in East 
Asia. American media concurred by emphasizing causality: “since the violation of quarantine 
by the German vessel cholera has so increased in Yokohama and Tokio … that these ports 
26 Frankfurter Zeitung, 1 March 1880 based on a Yokohama newspaper report from 3 January 1880.
27 Tanaka 1991.
28 Perez 1999, p. 199; Jones 1931, p. 68; Treat 1928a, p. 123.
29 Treat 1932, p. 89.
30 FRUS, no. 995, 22 October 1880, p. 652.
31 Bingham, “United States Legation”; [US Quarantine Announcement]. Sir Harry Parkes on 14 July 1879 
issued quarantine orders of 7 days for British vessels and threatening fines of “3 months imprisonment” or 
“500 dollars” administered through the H.B.M. Consular Court. The key difference from the U.S. was his 
insistence on inspection being done by people he appointed ( Japan Weekly Mail, 19 July 1879, p. 953).
32 Young 1879, pp. 454–613.
33 New York Times, 28 August 1879; Frankfurter Zeitung, 11 September 1879.
34 Araki 1959, p. 98; Treat 1928b, p. 272; Yamamoto 1943, p. 210; Pantzer and Saaler 2007, p. 26; Inoue 1968, 
p. 43.
35 Young 1879, p. 560.
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are now formally declared infected.”36 And to make sure their readers could properly 
distinguish between the good and the bad “America sides with Japan, but England supports 
Germany in this affair.”37 By contrast, the Frankfurter Zeitung, when first reporting on the 
incident warned German readers to treat news “via America” with caution since the United 
States had been trying for some time to make Japanese and Chinese mistrust Europeans to 
gain trade advantages.38
Let us now recapitulate the event itself.39 According to diplomatic records and media 
reports, the Hesperia left cholera-infected Kobe on Thursday 10 July 1879 at midday.40 When 
on the morning of the next day it arrived at Kannonzaki 観音崎 and was about to enter 
Tokyo bay, a boat sent by a Japanese naval cruiser ordered it to proceed to the quarantine 
grounds of Nagaura 長浦 (Yokosuka 横須賀). The governor of Kanagawa, Nomura Yasushi 
野村靖 had just announced a quarantine of seven days (some sources say ten days), and so 
the Hesperia was the first Western ship to be affected by this order. It thus became a test 
case of whether or not Japanese quarantine regula-
tions applied to foreign ships. When ordered into 
quarantine, Captain Friedrich Johannsen complied, 
and sent a message to the German Consulate asking 
for further instructions.41 On Saturday, the next day, 
the German Consul at Yokohama, Eduard Zappe 
(1843–88), and Head Surgeon of the German Naval 
Hospital in Yokohama, Dr. Hermann Gutschow 
(1843–1903), visited the ship.42 They found it free of 
disease. Based on the reports submitted by both Ger-
man men and the captain, the German Minister Karl 
von Eisendecher ordered the Hesperia to complete its 
journey on Monday 14 July. By the evening of that 
day, the Hesperia had left the quarantine grounds and 
entered Yokohama harbor.43 On 15 July, Tuesday, 
the Hesperia discharged its goods, and now the 
passengers disembarked.44 Among the passengers 
were the French Consul to Yokohama Henri Pierret 
36 New York Times, 28 August 1879.
37 New York Times, 27 September 1879.
38 Frankfurter Zeitung, Morgenblatt, 11 September 1879.
39 In German, Japanese and English the three most reliable accounts are Pantzer and Saaler 2007, pp. 26–28; 
Iokibe 2012, pp. 75–77; Hoare 1994, p. 92.
40 Diplomatic Correspondence in English: FRUS, 1879–1880, pp. 647–80; Diplomatic Correspondence in 
Japanese: Nihon Gaimushō 1879, pp. 289–304; Unpublished Diplomatic Correspondence in German: BArch 
Quarantänemaßnahmen/Japan. 
41 The press spelled his name in various ways. Matth Friedrich Johannsen is the name of the Hesperia captain in 
the files of the Staatsarchiv Hamburg.
42 Depending on the source, the dates vary from 11 July in the evening (Times), 12 July ( Japan Weekly Mail) 
up to 13 July. From a posting in Shanghai, Eduard Zappe transferred in 1871 to Yokohama where he died 
in 1888. Hermann Gutschow worked at the Yokohama hospital from 1878 to 1884. The German hospital 
existed between 1878 and 1911.
43 Nihon Gaimushō 1879.
44 Among the numerous accounts in newspapers, Iriye 1879; House 1879b; “The Quarantine Laws and the 
Hesperia,” Japan Weekly Mail, 19 July 1879.
Figure 2. Newspaper advertisement of the 
Hesperia passage to Yokohama. 
Source: Hiogo Shipping List and General 
Advertiser.
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and his wife.45 On Saturday 19 July, less than a week after its arrival, the Hesperia left Yoko-
hama for Fuzhou (Foochow) on the Fujian coast of China with tea and general merchandise 
from the German trading house L[ouis] Kniffler and Co.46 Breaking the Japanese quarantine 
failed to hurt its business relations with the local community as Yokohama newspapers 
continued to advertise Hesperia passages to such overseas harbors as Le Havre and Hamburg 
in 1885.47 Then, in 1894, the German Steamship Company of Hamburg sold this “iron ship,” 
originally constructed in Kiel in 1876, to an unnamed Japanese buyer.48
The standard international Hesperia narrative also alludes to gunboat diplomacy, 
reminiscent of Matthew Perry’s Black ships. The German “man of war” Wolf was accused of 
playing a “sinister” role.49 The German Allgemeine Zeitung criticized the protection offered 
by the Wolf  “a violent encroachment on the territorial sovereign rights of Japan,” and “an 
injury to Japanese warships” from whose custody the Hesperia was taken.50 The Wolf may 
have escorted the Hesperia into Yokohama 
harbor. It was anchored there when the 
Hesperia “disembarked passengers and cargo 
under the guns of a man-of-war flying the 
German ensign.”51 In July it was certainly 
one of three ships of the German naval 
squadron and one of ten foreign warships in 
Yokohama. The “canon boat Wolf ” was by 
far the smallest with 480 tons, 4 canons and 
a regular crew of 80 men. It was dwarfed 
even by the Hesperia with 1,136 tons. The 
overshadowing naval presence in Yokohama 
was the British Iron Duke with 6,034 
tons and 14 guns. The Wolf seems to have 
functioned as a faster boat to ferry people 
from one ship to another; it is in this context 
that newspapers mention it transporting the 
German consul and the medical doctor to 
and from the Hesperia.52 If Germany had 
really wanted to show its strength, it could 
have mobilized its entire fleet at anchorage. 
The German navy would anyway have been 
vastly outnumbered by the Japanese navy 
which had twenty three ships off icially 
45 Japan Herald Mail Summary, 16 July 1879. Henri Pierret came from New Orleans to Yokohama in 1877 and 
then transferred 1880 to Hong Kong.
46 Japan Weekly Mail, 19 July 1879.
47 L’Echo du Japon, 26 November 1885.
48 Staatsarchiv Hamburg. Deutsche Dampfschiffs-Rhederei zu Hamburg, 8 August 1894.
49 Treat 1932, p. 87.
50 [Hermann Roesler] Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 November 1879.
51 One Who Knows, “Correspondence: Hesperia Details,” Tokio Times, 9 August 1879, 81. The same phrase 
also appears in Times, 11 October 1879.
52 The Wolf departed for Shanghai on July 22 ( Japan Weekly Mail, July 5, 12, 19, 26, 1879).
Figure 3. Official German certificate of ship measurement 
for the Hesperia, 25 March 1876.
Source: Staatsarchiv Hamburg.
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stationed in Yokohama.53 Indeed, the popular press mentioned a Japanese warship following 
the Hesperia or ordering it into quarantine, as well as a standoff in the harbor when “police 
boats” surrounded the ship to prevent it from landing. This is when the Wolf  supplied a 
boat for passengers to leave the Hesperia.54 The key reason Japanese naval vessels appeared 
in the accounts is that the government had entrusted them with enforcing the quarantine 
on merchant vessels of all nationalities. War-mongering American journalist Edward House 
emphasized in his editorials Japanese righteous indignation and their right to sink foreign 
ships, but—fortunately—nobody listened. He recommended: “A warning shot from the 
Adzuma would probably have checked the Hesperia’s defiant audacity. If not, she would have 
better been sent to the bottom, than allowed to persevere in her lawless and guilty course.”55 
As prominent as the Wolf features in international narratives, Japanese newspapers do not 
even mention its existence.
Dr. D.B. Simmons, a f igure referred to as a 
“Japanese official,” is entirely absent from academic 
narratives as an individual actor. He does not f it 
the bipolar worldview of privileged foreigner versus 
exploited Japanese. He was an accepted member of 
the Yokohama medical community of foreign doctors, 
responsible for the quarantine hospital established in 
emergency to accommodate cholera patients. Contem-
porary media reports show him inspecting the Hesperia 
and agreeing with Captain Johannsen that the ship 
should be disinfected. They also claim that on 14 July Kanagawa governor, Nomura Yasushi, 
personally accompanied Dr. Simmons, as his medical advisor.58 When Eisendecher’s order 
for the ship to leave quarantine arrived, it allegedly surprised all. Dr. Simmons, according 
to newspaper reports, “thrice” prohibited this move and when the ship did enter the harbor, 
he again went on board and asked it to leave. While he clearly acted as representative of 
Japanese authorities, here was also a case of medical disagreement between Drs. Simmons 
and Gutschow. While newspapers never questioned the medical competence of the German 
Dr. Gutschow, some considered him to be “an interested party,” whereas Dr. Simmons was 
the person with the vested authority.59 The Hesperia disagreement did not prevent these men 
from cooperating later towards common cholera relief or patient care.60 In the context of the 
Hesperia controversy, it is interesting to note that Dr. Danne B. Simmons was an American. 
He had come to Japan in November 1859 as a Reformed (Dutch) Church missionary, then 
resigned from the Reformed Board to concentrate on the practice of medicine in Yokohama, 
which he did until 1882.61
53 Tatewaki 1996, 3, p. 18.
54 Japan Weekly Mail, 19 July 1879.
55 House 1879a.
56 S.M.S. Wolf, built in Wilhelmshafen for overseas duty, was completed in March 1878 and reached Singapore 
in February 1879 remaining in East Asia until 1884.
57 SMS Wolf 1878.
58 Iriye 1879.
59 Surgeon at the Japanese Hospital Noge (Tatewaki 1996,  pp. 10, 56, 102; Cary 1976, pp. 46, 49).
60  Japan Weekly Mail, 23 August 1879.
61 Cary 1976, pp. 46–49.
Figure 4. German gunboat of the “Wolf” 
category: sister ship named Hyäne (1878).56
Source: Wikimedia.57
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The behavior of Karl von Eisendecher, a former naval officer, who in 1875 had suc-
ceeded Max von Brandt as the German Minister in Japan, constitutes the key riddle in the 
incident. His biographer writes of his accommodating and cooperative personality. Indeed, 
later the chancellor Otto von Bismarck asked for his voluntary resignation as German 
representative in Washington for not forcefully representing German interests; on another 
occasion, Bismarck reprimanded him for an excessive understanding of the position of other 
states.62 On several occasions von Eisendecher himself expressed regret over the Hesperia in-
cident. In a letter to Alexander von Siebold (1846–1911), a German who had been employed 
by the Japanese government since 1870, he mentioned in late 1879 that “he was sorry for 
the affair.”63 In a personal note, he stressed that in seven years in Japan he had only once 
seriously upset the Japanese, namely when he was too strict in enforcing treaty rights in the 
quarantine issue.64 Even in his public writing to the Foreign Minister, he showed contrition 
albeit with some qualifications:
Finally, I express to Your Excellency my regret at the occurrence,
… 
If your Excellency had intimated to me, officially or privately, verbally or in writing, 
that the German authorities were doubtless entitled to be heard in the affair, and that 
the detention perhaps was not absolutely necessary, but that the Japanese Government 
were especially desirous that the quarantine in this case should last seven days, then I 
have no doubt that I should have complied with a desire thus intimated to me.
I regret especially, with regard to the Vice-Minister Mori and to the Minister of the 
Interior, to whom my thanks are due for their conciliatory efforts, that the affair at last 
took a turn that was unpleasant to all the parties.65
What turned the Hesperia event into a larger international affair was not mere misunder-
standing. As far as the spread of cholera was concerned, Eisendecher fully believed that he 
could trust the judgment of his good friend Hermann Gutschow, who had described in 
detail the previous contacts of the ship in Kobe and China, the health of passengers and 
crewmembers, and sources of food supply including drinking water.66 There is no evidence 
that Eisendecher acted under pressure from the ship’s agents or owners to release the ship for 
commercial reasons, although he did threaten to hold the Japanese government responsible 
“to the full extent for all the losses arising from the detention of the ship.”67 There was a core 
difference of opinion in interpreting the meaning of the international treaties. An innocent 
sounding letter by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Terashima Munenori 寺島宗
則 (1832–93) proved to be a turning point, transforming hitherto cooperative German 
diplomats into self-righteous adversaries. In the letter, dated 12 July 1879, Terashima 
acknowledged the German effort to inspect the ships for traces of cholera, but he categori-
cally denied that these actions mattered. Regardless of the results, the Japanese quarantine 
regulations would be applied to their full extent and duration:
62 Hoffmann 2011.
63 “Die ganze Sache thut mir ja selbst leid,” 14 December 1879 (Siebold 2000, pp. 327–29).
64 PAAA, Nachlaß Eisendecher, 2/8, no. 1a.
65 FRUS, 1879–1880, p. 680.
66 On their close relationship, Pantzer and Saaler 2007, p. 34.
67 Suggestion of economic motives. “When we saw how every humane principle was forgotten when money came 
into question, we turned away in bitterness and disgust” (Mitsukuri 1881, p. 492; FRUS, 1879–1880, p. 677).
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Sir: I have had the honor to receive Your Excellency’s favor of yesterday, in which you 
inform me that you have instructed the German chief staff-surgeon, Dr. Gutschow, to 
proceed on board the German steamer Hesperia, which is now, according to the quar-
antine regulations, detained at Soshu Nagaura, there to make a medical inspection, 
and in which Your Excellency requests me to take the necessary measures, in order 
that no difficulties shall arise at the place. I have immediately notified the authorities 
concerned, but, at the same time, I must respectfully inform Your Excellency that the 
inspection by the said medical officer can have no influence on the duration of the 
prescribed term of quarantine.
 With the highest consideration,
Terashima Munenori (Minister of Foreign Affairs)68
Eisendecher’s tone changed and he immediately sent telegrams to Berlin, which consulted 
with London and Paris.69 On the same day he sent a threatening letter to Terashima. 
Detention “without sufficient cause” would result in the Japanese government bearing “the 
full responsibility,” and he “could not answer for the consequences.” In subsequent cor-
respondence, he emphasized that for medical reasons no further quarantine was necessary. 
But getting to the core of the problem he responded as follows:
I am to understand that Your Excellency, without paying any regard to the opinion 
of a German expert, intends indiscriminately to detain on the quarantine grounds all 
German vessels arriving in the bay of Yedo from Kobe or Osaka. I am unable under 
the existing treaties between Germany and Japan to admit such a right of exclusive 
disposition of German vessels.
In case Your Excellency really pretends to such a right on behalf of your government, 
then I feel compelled most formally to protest against it on behalf of the government of 
the German Empire.70
After receiving no answers to three letters he sent over the weekend, Eisendecher issued his 
controversial order to break the quarantine on Monday. The ship discharged its goods on 
the 15th. This was five days after departure from Kobe and two days short of the seven day 
period of quarantine set for naval vessels (if one includes the travel period), but similar to 
the five days of quarantine ordered for land travel. The small local event in Yokohama may 
have remained such if the diplomats had agreed to let the issues fade away. Instead, they 
continued their correspondence until the end of the month with Terashima insisting on the 
Japanese empire’s “lawful regulations” while Eisendecher invoked the right under existing 
treaties, “which invest the German authorities with jurisdiction over German ships.” The 
press escalated the conflict. Already on 16 July the Courier du Japon reported on it. In 
response to critical articles on the quarantine issue in the Japan Mail and the Tokio Times, 
the Japan Daily Herald published the diplomatic correspondence presumably provided by 
the foreign diplomats between the Japanese government and foreign representatives from 
22 July 1879, which further provided ample material for public debate. This controversy 
68 FRUS, 1879–1880, p. 676; Nihon Gaimushō 1879.
69 BArch R 901/20618.
70 FRUS, 1879–1880, p. 677.
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proved so politically disruptive that the Japanese government issued a new press ordinance 
prohibiting newspapers from publishing articles “related to foreign countries” without prior 
government review. The press in China also reported on these regulations, complaining 
about press enslavement; however, it agreed that unless the provocative “fire and steel ar-
ticles” were extinguished the outcome would be the “certain humiliation of the Government 
of Japan.” With new censorship rules in place, the state could then be held responsible in 
case of attacks on “Mr. von Eisendecher, Sir Harry Parkes” or other foreign ministers.71
The press and public uproar about the behavior of foreign treaty powers had other 
unexpected consequences. On 10 September, Terashima Munenori vacated his Foreign 
Ministry position in a cabinet reshuffle. Karl von Eisendecher, his recent opponent, believed 
the reason was Terashima’s confrontational approach in the quarantine question, especially 
the Hesperia affair. “Even my American colleague,” Eisendecher opined, who has always 
been supportive of Terashima’s foreign policy, criticized his “tenacious obstinacy, lack of 
logic and especially courtesy.” Moreover, he grumbled about Terashima’s “unreliability 
and perpetual mistrust,” seeing in every irrelevant issue “inimical intentions and plans.” 
Eisendecher concluded that for everyone Terashima’s departure was “very gratifying.”72 The 
Hiogo News unkindly called Terashima’s new portfolio as Minister of Education “an asylum 
for imbecile ministers.”73 Japanese scholars confirm that the Hesperia incident caused 
outrage in the government and public, and so contributed to Terashima’s departure.74 
Eisendecher too considered his own position to be insecure enough in August 1879 that he 
confessed he may have to depart, if local criticism of his actions endured and because the 
Japanese were making “lots of official noise” in Berlin.75 Berlin, however, promoted him in 
April 1880 to the new title of Envoy—from consul general (Generalkonsul) and minister-
resident (Ministerresident) to minister (Gesandter)—, which may have reflected the rising 
international importance of Japan, but it also demonstrated his government’s approval of his 
work.76 Eisendecher was a political survivor of this diplomatic skirmish over the Hesperia, 
but the broader issues of treaty relations and maritime quarantine remained contentious.
Containing Cholera in International and Japanese Contexts
“Cholera is an easily treatable disease. The prompt administration of oral rehydration salts 
to replace lost fluids nearly always results in cure,” writes the World Health Organization 
(WHO) on its website.77 Now it is common knowledge that the microscopic Vibrio cholerae 
bacillus causes the disease. In warm and humid circumstances, especially river water, it 
thrives and lives up to twenty days. It can also survive in fruits and vegetables washed in 
infected water. Humans are only affected if the bacteria is absorbed through their digestive 
tracks either through eating or drinking or when infected hands touch mouths. On feces 
the bacillus lives for up to fifteen days, and in dust for about a week, so other sources of 
transmission come to include clothes, bedding, and communal water supply/lavatories. 
71 North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette, 2 September 1879.
72 PAAA, R18602, Nachlaß Eisendecher, no. 118, A 54, Eisendecher to von Bülow, 29 September 1879.
73 Hiogo News, 17 September 1879.
74 Iokibe 2010, pp. 66–68; Tatsukawa 1971, p. 197.
75 Hoffmann 2011, p. 265; Siebold 2000, pp. 327–29.
76 Pantzer and Saaler 2007, p. 376.
77 World Health Organization 2014.
Informal Imperialism and the 1879 Hesperia Incident
115
Scrupulous personal hygiene is the most effective way to combat the disease. During an 
epidemic the bacilli can be killed in water by boiling, and they are not resistant to most 
disinfectants. They only survive a few minutes in wine or spirits and a few hours in beer. 
Cholera is a seasonal epidemic, and it tends to break out in warm and humid weather. In-
fected water supplies and inefficient sewage systems are a common source of contamination 
in overcrowded living conditions and personal contacts with victims was a key factor in the 
geographical spread.78
The worldwide diffusion of cholera in the nineteenth century provided the background 
to the Hesperia incident. Cholera had existed in South Asia since ancient times and with the 
globalization of trade and increasing migration, it became one of the most deadly diseases of 
the century. In what has been called the first pandemic, cholera spread through Southeast 
Asia, the Middle East, China and Japan between 1817 and 1822. The second pandemic, 
from 1827 to 1835, also affected the United States and Europe. Another pandemic cholera 
devastated Japan in 1858, and it remained in the country after 1877 in an endemic state.79
Understanding the causes of the disease took some time. John Snow (1813–58) proved 
the link between contaminated drinking water and cholera in a midcentury cholera outbreak 
in London, which galvanized significant investments in modern sewage facilities. By 1884, 
Robert Koch (1843–1910) identified the cholera bacterium through work on fecal matter in 
Bombay, and published his findings academically.80 By the end of the century, alternative 
explanations of the causes of cholera such as the miasma theory of the German scientist Max 
von Pettenkofer (1818–1901) had become obsolete in Europe. Miasma believers stressed the 
transmission of cholera through the air, and argued for the improvement of specific local 
conditions, but they did not believe in the efficiency of quarantine or strict isolation.81
78 Evans 1987, pp. 226–28.
79 Johnston 2012, p. 31.
80 The Italian Filippo Pacini (1812–83) is now officially credited as the original discoverer of Vibrio cholera in 1854.
81 Evans 1987, pp. 264–77, 490–508.
Figure 5. Karl von Eisendecher and Terashima Munenori before 1872.
Source: Pantzer and Saaler, Karl von Eisendecher, pp. 20 and 185.
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A global medical consensus took longer to congeal. Conferences such as those in 
Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1866 and later in Vienna in 1874 helped to disseminate the 
latest knowledge, identifying key steps on how to slow-down the spread of this violent 
contagious disease: (1) quarantine of ships at sea; (2) cordon sanitaire for checking people 
on land and (3) isolation of cholera patients.82 Such measures became common practice in 
Europe and the United States. In September 1879, Harper’s Weekly described ships arriving 
in the port of New York being routinely checked for cholera patients. If the disease was 
found on board, the vessel was fumigated and subjected to quarantine of twenty four hours 
or longer.83 However, the views of experts and policy-makers continued to diverge until the 
end of the century. Robert Koch’s theories were first not fully accepted among his peers. 
Due to the nature of the disease, he was unable to offer scientific proof by reproducing it in 
infected animal subjects. Moreover, even with a better understanding of the causes, not all 
countermeasures found broad approval, and there was much public criticism of the utility of 
what some perceived as excessive and harsh procedures. 
One source of resistance was the image of cholera as a disease of the poor and 
unclean, less likely to affect metropolitan elites. Then there was concern that worldwide 
measures of quarantine and isolation would disrupt international trade and prove costly 
to investors for whom “time” increasingly meant “money.”84 The era of free traded ended 
in Europe as in Germany in 1879, when import tariffs and quotas were introduced. 
Richard Evans reminds us of the “widely held thesis that anti contagionism was dominant 
when liberalism and free trade were dominant.” He sees this exemplified in the German 
case when “Pettenkofer’s years of influence, the 1860s and 1870s, coincided with the era 
of free trade in Germany, while Koch’s inf luence became paramount as protection was 
adopted.” Comprehensive quarantine measures, following Koch’s contagionist views, were 
in line with the new interventionist climate of Imperial government in Berlin towards the 
German states in the 1880s.85 In his work on epidemics, Sheldon Watt extends that line of 
reasoning to the relationship of metropolitan elites and dependent colonies. He argues for 
the interests of “capitalist cosmopolitan elites” in delaying the application of modern British 
medical theories and practices to British India. There, advocates of the miasma theory were 
deliberately appointed as medical experts since they saw no need for quarantine or isolation, 
and posed no threat to the free circulation of goods and people. As a result, essential 
infrastructural improvements to the water supply were neglected, so that as late as 1900 in 
British India a cholera epidemic could cost one million lives.86
The critical question in terms of the Hesperia incident is whether European diplomats 
in Japan in the 1870s were behind the times or, at least tacitly, endorsing or enforcing a 
semi-colonial version of hygienic modernity, while Japanese officials were fighting for their 
national independence by invoking the new dominant vision of metropolitan hygiene. 
Cholera first entered Japan late in the year 1822 either from Dutch Batavia (Java), where it 
had raged for two years, via the port of Nagasaki or through Korea via the island of Tsushima 
and the port of Shimonoseki.87 The terror and fear it provoked was noted by a witness:
82 Watts 1997.
83 “Quarantine at New York,” Harper’s Weekly, 6 September 1879. 
84 The Hesperia was detained in quarantine at the Suez Canal in the 1880s.
85 Evans 1987, p. 269.
86 Watts 1997, pp. 120, 124.
87 Yamamoto 1982, pp. 5–8.
Informal Imperialism and the 1879 Hesperia Incident
117
In Osaka today enormous numbers of people are dying from a severe epidemic. There 
are funeral rites for two and three hundred persons every day. The disease begins with 
diarrhea, and the stomach is severely distorted and twisted out of shape. Abdominal 
pains, vomiting, and cramps in the arms and legs soon follow. In this disease, after one 
or two diarrhetic movements, the arms and legs turn cold, and the vital pulse disap-
pears. The eyes recede upward, and the person dies within half-a-day....88
Japanese medical practitioners at the time were at a complete loss, some prescribing the so-
called Osaka remedy of distilled shōchū liquor. What in Europe became known as “Asiatic 
Cholera,” in Japan was called the “Southern Barbarian” disease. Other terms, emphasizing 
the violent and immediate impact of the disease, were mikka korori 三日コロリ (collapse in 
three days), and hanji korori 半時コロリ(sudden collapse).89 Cholera subsided, however, as 
winter approached and it stopped at Hakone without reaching Eastern Japan. With the 
third worldwide pandemic and the opening of Japanese ports to Western traders, the U.S. 
warship Mississippi reintroduced cholera to Nagasaki in 1858. This time, it reached the 
capital causing about 100,000 deaths and leaving a deep and lasting public impression. The 
1858 international treaties were signed in the year of the Ansei cholera epidemic, which, 
according to Tetsuo Najita, “added enormously to the feelings of disorientation and uncer-
tainty that pervaded the social landscape.” People also referred to cholera as Eijin no doku, 
the “Englishman’s poison,” believing it was opium.90
The extent to which the disease persisted in Japan is disputed, but it is clear that 
after the year 1877 during the next epidemic wave, it was causing annual deaths, with the 
death toll especially high in 1882, 1886, 1890 and 1895.91 In the late 1870s and 1880s, 
the disease was still associated with its overseas origins among foreigners and Japanese. “I 
have no doubt the disease came from India to China and thence to Japan,” U.S. Minister 
John Bingham wrote in 1877. “I trust it may not find its way to America or Europe.”92 
From Niigata two years later, a British diplomat reported heightened anti-foreign feelings 
during a severe outbreak of cholera, with rumors of Christians having poisoned the wells. 
Suspicion of foreign doctors persisted as people claimed they wanted Japanese to die in 
order to export human livers overseas. The Japanese governor of Niigata thus considered 
it prudent for foreigners, including missionaries with medical knowledge, not to travel 
out of town, especially during the cholera riots.93 The Japanese bacteriologist, Kitasato 
Shibasaburō 北里柴三郎 (1853–1931), who studied under Koch in Berlin and discovered 
the tetanus bacillus in 1889, provided one of the most damning medical assessments 
of the foreign origin of cholera in 1887, linking its deliberate spread to a form of naval 
warfare and a continuous violation of national sovereignty. Western warships (Kriegsschiffe) 
carried cholera: American in 1858, English in 1877 and English and French in 1885. 
Cholera was not a native disease, he said, “it has always been introduced from the East 
Asian continent.” Japanese government attempts to block the disease were in vain, “because 
88 Najita 1999, p. 232; Yamamoto 1982, pp. 11–12.
89 Yamamoto 1982, p. 11.
90 Jannetta 1987, pp. 155–72; Najita 1999.
91 Nagayo 1877.
92 FRUS, 15 November 1877, p. 482.
93 Japan, no. 1 (1880). Commercial reports by Her Majesty’s consuls in Japan. Mr. Wooley to Mr. Kennedy, 8 
October 1879.
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foreign ships break the quarantine,” and foreign governments and foreign individuals “re-
sist” (widerstehen). “We have to put up with the epidemic being introduced over and over 
again to our country and all we can do now is to contain the disease under tremendous 
cost and hope to succeed in its suppression.” This “terrible misfortune” killed a quarter 
of a million people in the last decade and weighs heavily on the country, “but most 
importantly it disrupts trade and transportation.”94 The discourse on the foreign origin 
of cholera in Japan was ubiquitous, but there was a deafening silence on Japan’s exporting 
contagious disease to its maritime neighbors like Korea and China.
Regardless of the place of origin of the annual 
cholera waves, they often had a disproportionate 
effect on coastal areas, so there was a heightened 
political and public concern to protect port cities 
and especially regulate vessels from abroad. Some 
academic narratives on the Hesperia insist that it 
introduced cholera from China, despite the fact that 
it had embarked in the port of Kobe to travel to 
Yokohama.95
Fear of cholera once again became widespread 
and strong in Japan during the hot summer of 1879. 
Cholera was still truly a frightening disease, literally 
of epidemic proportions. By the end of that year, 
the epidemic had cost 105,786 lives and Japanese 
statistics noted a total of 162,637 cases, which to 
this very day is the highest number in the official 
government record.96 Most patients died within a 
few days. Stories appeared in the Japanese treaty 
port newspapers of healthy sailors having worked 
hard, drunk a lot of water before being sick and dead 
by the next morning; there were accounts too of 
unsuspecting families being wiped out within days. 
Yomiuri shinbun reported the sad story of a young 
self-sacrificing wife who drowned herself after she 
had diarrhea for fear of having contracted cholera, 
which would have caused trouble to her husband 
and neighborhood.97
For the epidemic wave of 1879, contemporary 
medical opinion questioned the foreign origin 
thesis. At a widely reported meeting of the Tsukiji 
Board of Health in late July 1879, the German Dr. 
Dönitz gave this explanation of the likely cause: The 
94 Kitasato 1887, pp. 213–17.
95 Among others the China claim is made by Inoue 1968, p. 42.
96 Ministry of Health and Welfare Statistics. “Patients and Deaths of Infectious Diseases and Food Poisoning 
(1876–1999).” http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/chouki/24.htm.
97 Yomiuri shinbun, 6 July 1879.
Year Patients Deaths
1877 13.816 8.027
1878 902 275
1879 162.637 105.786
1880 1.580 618
1881 9.389 6.237
1882 51.631 33.784
1883 969 434
1884 904 417
1885 13.824 9.348
1886 155.923 109.012
1887 1.228 655
1888 811 460
1889 751 431
1890 46.019 35.422
1891 11.142 7.767
1892 874 497
1893 633 364
1894 546 314
1895 55.144 40.241
1896 1.481 908
1897 894 488
1898 655 374
1899 829 2
1900 378 –
Table 1. Official government statistics on 
cholera patients and deaths, 1876–1900.
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare 
Statistics. http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/
chouki/24.htm.
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Japanese government for religious rea-
sons had opened the graves of soldiers, 
who had died during the civil war in 
1877. Since many of these soldiers 
had succumbed to cholera, the disease 
reappeared in Kyushu before slowly 
spreading to Kobe. The ship Hiroshima 
maru then transported it to Yokohama 
and Tokyo.98 Less f lamboyant was 
a lengthy review of symptoms and 
evidence for cholera signed by ten for-
eign medical doctors. They discussed 
the possibilities of health problems 
exacerbated by unripe f ruit s and 
vegetables, impure water and deficient 
drainage and poor ventilation and hu-
man contact. They identified the first 
cholera passengers as having arrived 
from Kobe on 18 June via the Niigata 
maru and on 19 June with the Hiro-
shima maru—evidence corroborated 
by the American Dr. Simmons, who 
had personally treated the patients. By 
then, 2 August, the doctors admitted 
that the disease in Yokohama had “already assumed epidemic proportions.”99 A few days 
later, the Japanese authorities ended the compulsory quarantine of ships since cholera had 
become prevalent in Yokohama and Tokyo. Ships would only need to undergo “inspection” 
and “disinfection.”100
The official Japanese government report by the Central Sanitary Bureau on the 1879 
cholera epidemic traces the outbreak of that year to a village in Ehime prefecture on 14 
March 1879, and sets the date for the arrival of cholera in Kanagawa prefecture (Yokohama) 
to 18 June and its end to 29 November. The prefectural cholera death toll amounted to 1,493 
people and the death rate of infected patients was the staggeringly high one of 70%.101 Neither 
the government cholera reports nor Yamamoto Jun’ichi’s authoritative Japanese medical 
history of cholera mentioned the Hesperia.102 Japanese scholarship on the Hesperia incident 
from a medical perspective does not exist.103 Despite all the political fuss over the actions of 
the Hesperia, no report ever traced a single case of cholera to this German ship arriving in 
Yokohama on 15 July, as was duly noted by Sir Harry Parkes in his reports.104 Documented 
  98 “The Tsukiji Board of Health,” Japan Weekly Mail, 2 August 1879.
  99 Hepburn 1879, pp. 992–97.
100 Board of Health, Home Department, “Notification,” Japan Weekly Mail, 9 August 1879, p. 1038.
101 Nagayo 1879, pp. 1–6. For a history of Meiji public health administration, see Johnston 1995, pp. 173–78.
102 Yamamoto 1982, p. 46.
103 Hesperia is mentioned in the authoritative history of quarantine regulations in Japan but no medical analysis 
is attempted (Kōseishō 1980, p. 18).
104 TNA, F.O. 46/247.
Map 1. Map showing infected districts in 1879.
Source: Nagayo 1879, p. 20.
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cholera cases preceded the ship’s arrival by almost one month and, considering the conta-
gious nature of the disease, with patients dying within a few days, quarantine measures for 
Yokohama by mid-July probably came too late to contain the spread of the disease. Even if 
there had been cholera cases on board, they would not have made a significant difference. 
So, in a narrow medical sense, we can exonerate Karl von Eisendecher and the Hesperia for 
either bringing cholera to Japan or disseminating it further from Kobe to Yokohama and 
then to Tokyo and Eastern Japan.
In 1879 the causes and cures for cholera where still unknown. Quarantine, together 
with individual isolation at home, served to contain the spread of a disease. D.B. Simmons 
is credited with establishing the first quarantine hospital for infectious diseases in Kanagawa 
prefecture. A 1877 ukiyoe print (Figure 6), possibly depicting him as the balding man 
in Western-style clothes with a female patient, warns about the disease coming from the 
Southwest to Yokohama, and mentions symptoms such as diarrhea. It advises against oily 
food and raw fish. Contrary 
to social customs and ideals 
o f  f a m i l y  s o l i d a r i t y,  t h e 
ukiyoe text insists there be no 
interaction with patients even 
if they are parents or children. 
The fact is that  a cure did 
not exist, but carbolic acid or 
phenol (sekitansan 石炭酸) was 
so widely used as a disinfectant 
that prices tripled in Yokohama 
within two weeks.105 The 1877 
government cholera report ex-
plained how to produce and use 
disinfectants on patients, and 
anything they could have come 
in touch with. Items that could 
not be properly disinfected were 
to be buried and burned in the 
ground.106
Diplomatic doubt about 
t he  me d i c a l  ne c e s s i t y  o f 
long quarantine and about 
the Japanese government’s 
ability to maintain a system 
of isolation triggered the row 
over  t he  de tent ion of  t he 
Hesperia. Japanese notions of 
public hygiene, however, had 
105 Ōtaki 1992, p. 8.
106 Nagayo 1877, pp. 43–54.
107 Itō 2013.
Figure 6. The story of the sickness of cholera Korera byō no hanashi 
(1877) by Utagawa Yoshitora 歌川芳虎 (1836–82).107 Source: UC San 
Francisco Japanese Woodblock Print Collection.
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been influenced by Germany. As the Imperial Oath of 1868 had promised, Japan should 
be “seeking knowledge throughout the world” and so Japanese went abroad. One of the 
most important Meiji period public health bureaucrats had studied in Nagasaki with 
the Dutch doctor Pompe van Meerdervoort (1829–1908), before he participated in the 
Iwakura mission. Upon his return, Nagayo Sensai 長与専斎 (1838–1902) became a leading 
government figure in the Japanese movement for public health, a term which he rendered 
from the German Gesundheitspflege into kōshū eisei 公衆衛生. His neologism eisei 衛生 
for “hygiene” so caught the imagination of a wider public that he felt compelled in 1883 
to clarify that it did not mean “easy living, delicious foods, or luxury,” but “to discipline 
the body”; “to strengthen the soldiers’ vitality.” As historian Susan Burns writes, “Nagayo 
Sensai viewed sickness and disease as threats to the wellbeing of the “national body,” the 
literal rendering of the Japanese term kokutai, or “national polity.” The principles of the 
emerging Japanese medical system of the 1870s and 1880s she summarizes as “policing 
and confinement,” in order to deal “with the ‘danger’ that disease posed to the creation 
of a large healthy population of potential workers and soldiers.”108 Appointed in 1875 as 
the first Director of the Sanitary Affairs Bureau (Eiseikyoku 衛生局), Nagayo served in 
this capacity for seventeen years and, in accord with contemporary German notions of 
public hygiene, also developed statistical surveys of disease and policies designed to contain 
epidemics. Reading through the cholera reports of the bureau, one is struck again and again 
by the strong interventionist language of the central government. Unifying, mobilizing and 
inspecting the Japanese nation to combat the (foreign) disease constitute a major theme. By 
the 1880s, public health officers were no longer local government administrators, but the 
police.109 Cholera reports in the English-language convey an image of medical modernity 
also to an international readership.
After a cholera scare in August 1873, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Treaty Powers cooperated in jointly drawing up “Regulations for inspection at the Open 
Ports in Japan” to establish a policy for the quarantine of ships from cholera-infected localities. 
Then the government sought and obtained the consent of foreign diplomats. One of its 
key features was a “Quarantine Commission” consisting of the local governor, or another 
principal Japanese officer, and all the consuls at each open port.110 A crisis occurred in July 
1877 when reports reached Nagayo Sensai’s bureau about an overseas cholera outbreak. 
The bureau immediately instituted its emergency measures and informed the respective 
government agencies. Within a few days it had to cancel its previous order and postpone 
all measures due to the resistance of Sir Harry Parkes. The Japanese administration was so 
upset that it explicitly singled out foreign powers for exacerbating the spread of cholera: “The 
lives of the seven thousand eight hundred persons … might not have been saved, if measures 
of medical inspection had been adopted at the open ports … when there had not yet been 
one case of cholera reported in our country.”111
A Japanese medical student ten years later cited verbatim from this report in a German 
medical journal. Mori Rintarō 森林太郎, better known under his literary penname Mori 
Ōgai 森鷗外 studied under Robert Koch in Berlin and Max von Pettenkofer in Munich 
108 Burns 2000, pp. 17–19.
109 One of the earliest Cholera Reports, Nagayo 1877. One of the later ones in the same format, Nagayo 1890.
110 Treat 1932, pp. 38–39.
111 Nagayo 1877, pp. 8–10, 13–14.
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when in Germany between 1884 and 1888.112 Mori, the future surgeon-general of the 
Japanese army, stressed Great Britain’s diplomatic obstruction of cholera quarantine.113 The 
section of the report cited by Mori explained English logic:
It is not necessary to establish, at present, quarantine hospitals at Yokohama and other 
open ports of Japan, for a telegram from H. E. the Governor of Hong Kong, sent in 
reply to the inquiry of H. E. the British Minister at Tokyo, says, that there seems to 
be no fear of a further spread of the disease at Amoy .... Accordingly the establish-
ment of medical inspection or quarantine is not needed in Japan, under the present 
circumstances.114
Mori Rintarō criticized British diplomats and applied German medical research. As is 
known worldwide, Mori claimed, the English always deny the contagiousness of cholera (die 
Engländer in Cholerafragen stets antiephodistisch gesinnt sind), however for other reasons 
than the so-called hygienists (Hygieniker).115 Mori fiercely defended Japanese public health 
measures and praised the Quarantine Office in Nagaura for maintaining a universally 
admired institution of isolation. However, his main conclusion was “the time is over now” 
when foreigners may easily be “recognizing issues of research in East Asia, which had not 
been visible to the native scholar.”116
For proof of the contagiousness of the disease and to argue for the need to protect 
Japan’s maritime borders, Mori  turned to the German doctor Wilhelm Dönitz (1838–1912), 
who taught at Japanese universities between 1873 and 1886 before taking up a position with 
Robert Koch in Berlin.117 Dönitz directly attacked the non-contagion theories of Max von 
Pettenkofer. Japan became a powerful real life medical case study for Dönitz to influence 
German medicine. As Dönitz had closely mapped the spread of several cholera epidemics 
in Japan, he could show how it spread along roads or high traffic, and how infections in 
a village that supplied a fish market were one of the causes for much contagion in Tokyo. 
His strongest evidence was from a single ship in a disease-free harbor. In summer 1885, 
an officer of a French warship coming from Tongking in Vietnam died just after the ship 
set anchor in Nagasaki. A Japanese washman was entrusted with the clothes of the dead 
man, and within two to three days he and his wife had died of cholera. From this couple 
within a few weeks developed one of the most murderous epidemics of cholera on record in 
Nagasaki. “Based on these facts,” Dönitz concluded, how could von Pettenkofer still claim 
cholera was not a contagious disease and “cholera-infected clothes were harmless?”118 Dönitz 
implicitly also criticized another famous German doctor—his compatriot at Tokyo Imperial 
112 Kim 2014, pp. 70–71, 98.
113 By 1885, Japanese navy experiments had shown that diet was the cause of beriberi. Mori’s article contrasted 
fast-death by cholera to the slowly spreading disease of beriberi, which had a lower mortality rate. However, 
already by 1885 Japanese navy medical experiments had shown that diet must be the cause of beriberi 
without yet understanding the cause of vitamin-deficiency. Mori’s insistence on a bacteriological explanation 
for beriberi caused a large number of fatalities in the Russo-Japanese war due to malnutrition (Mori 1887).
114 Mori 1887, p. 307.
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University, a medical professor well-known for believing in the miasma theory: Erwin Bälz 
(1849–1913).119 Despite theoretical differences within the German medical community 
in Japan, reflecting those in Germany, what is remarkable is the extent of international 
cooperation and of community involvement in the relief effort in 1879. “16 July 1879: Six 
hours cholera committee meeting” with a Dutch, an English and Japanese colleagues is one 
of the diary entries of Erwin Bälz. It is followed by this entry: “23 July 1879 for a week now 
meetings at the health department every day … unfortunately the work does not progress 
as fast as desired…holidays I only have on paper.”120 Just as at the national level, doctors of 
several nations were active in the local Yokohama board of health.121
Sir Harry Parkes in the late 1870s also had a firm view on the medical necessity of 
maritime quarantine to contain contagious diseases, namely one that was least disruptive 
to international trade. Instead of quarantine he recommended the Japanese government 
implement a system of “medical inspection,” as suggested at the Vienna International 
Sanitary conference of 1874. His medical opinion thus diverged from the contemporary 
Japanese and international public interpretation of the 1879 Hesperia incident, even though 
he claimed otherwise. Parkes wrote: “In the short space of little more than a month they 
have satisfied themselves that Quarantine is useless to check the spread within the country 
of an epidemic of native origin, and that the measures which they attempted are unsound 
and impracticable.” Parkes also defined his role as protecting British subjects from “useless 
vexations” and “from the unnecessary if not arbitrary interference with their liberties.”122 He 
also justified his opposition to Japanese quarantine policies by insisting the British represent 
“more than half the foreign shipping” coming to Japan. When Vice Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Mori Arinori 森有礼 (1847–89) convened a Health Commission in 1878, and 
Britain’s diplomatic representative was denied the right to vote, Parkes officially withdrew 
his delegate and consular court judge Hiram Shaw Wilkinson (1840–1926), because he was 
thus placed in a “derogatory position.” 
There was a philosophical difference in 
combatting contagious disease. Mori, 
according to Parkes, argued that Japan 
should not consider foreign countries as 
a model but should rather “frame and 
adopt her own system,” which should be 
particularly “stringent.”123 Parkes, whom 
some Japanese writers later compared to 
Napoleon, was fully aware of his stalling 
reputation.124
To h i s  w i fe  he cr it ic i z ed the 
“impossible quarantine regulations to 
which they expected foreign ships to 
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submit.” He bragged about his influence and insisted on the righteousness of his stance: 
“The other Ministers also did nothing because they awaited my return ... the Japanese 
Government have had to rescind the regulations they made in my absence and issue new 
ones …”125 Needless to say, he privately expressed contempt for the U.S. Minister Bingham, 
“who argued so strongly, loudly, and discourteously in favor of the Revised Regulations” 
for quarantine that Parkes suspected him of involvement in the Japanese drafting process, 
or even of having written the rules himself.126 Their conceptual difference in interpreting 
extraterritoriality clearly turned into personal animosity. 
When the Anglo-German alliance on quarantine regulations formed in 1879, the other 
foreign powers were silent to the extent that the Japan Herald named each country whose 
official position they had not heard: France, Netherlands, Spain, Belgium and Denmark.127 
Parkes himself claimed the (almost) full support of the other treaty powers when discussing 
quarantine regulations with the Japanese government. Diplomatic records reveal a split 
into two camps: Great Britain, Germany, and France against the enforcement of Japanese 
quarantine regulations without foreign consent, versus the United States, Russia and Italy 
accepting Japanese emergency measures.128 In Europe, France had been at the forefront of 
the maritime quarantine movement due to fear of epidemics spreading from the Middle 
East. In Japan in 1879 there is no evidence of a distinct French diplomatic position in the 
public debate despite the fact that the French consul was a passenger on the Hesperia and 
the newspaper L’Echo du Japon was rather critical of German diplomacy in the affair.129
Imai Shōji argues that, in the aftermath of the Hesperia incident, quarantine regula-
tions were always drawn up in consultation with foreign powers. Medical boards included 
foreign medical experts and quarantine for foreigners demanded consular consent.130 No 
further diplomatic interference or blockade of implementation is known or mentioned in 
the official cholera reports or the official hundred year history of quarantine.131 Just like the 
other rules of extraterritoriality, 1899 proved the watershed year of independence in the 
quarantine question. The quarantine law of 1899 required that quarantine of ships from 
infected foreign ports hoist the international signal for epidemics, a yellow flag, when they 
reached a Japanese harbor. It set a fine of up to 500 yen for transgression.132 No exceptions 
would be granted. Japan thus gained full legal and administrative control in its battle with 
infectious diseases.
The Hesperia incident reflected a shift in Japanese and international medical persuasions 
and practices towards greater quarantine and isolation. The Japanese insistence on a strict 
quarantine regimen for ships went further than was common at the time or even afterwards 
when a simple inspection of a passenger list or twenty four hour quarantine was the norm 
as described and mocked as ineffective for Hong Kong, Suez and Le Havre by Dönitz on 
his voyage home to Germany in 1885 from an infected Japanese port. Dönitz contrasted 
the exemplary and systematic Japanese effort with the superficial and arbitrary practices in 
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other coastal regions: “The further East one gets, the lighter it becomes,” but it was worst in 
Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore “where foreigners rule”; they know from long experience 
that cholera rarely affects them.133 The Japanese frustration with foreign diplomats who, in 
earlier years prevented what Japanese deemed necessary medical measures, may have added 
to an intransigent attitude. By the 1880s, the endemic nature of the disease had reduced the 
threat of cholera being spread from abroad. Nevertheless, German ships in later years—
unlike the Hesperia in 1879—appear to have transported cholera from China to Japan 
without undergoing any quarantine. The 1890 report of a cholera epidemic that cost 35,000 
lives explains that several coolies died in Nagasaki in June 1890 “after violent vomiting and 
diarrhea” subsequent to unloading cargo from the German steamship Swatow from Shang-
hai and the German vessel Vorwärts from Hong Kong.134 Just like in earlier years, Japanese 
blamed foreigners for (re)introducing cholera and preventing effective counter measures. 
When the central board of health wanted to enact a permanent maritime quarantine law in 
November 1890 “a foreign” committee member prevented it arguing that cholera had al-
ready been endemic in Japan for a decade.135 Despite the establishment of a modern medical 
maritime quarantine system, Japan was irreversibly integrated into the international flow of 
goods and people, and contagious diseases. On 8 November 1899 bubonic plague appeared 
in Japan.
Challenging Extraterritoriality and Emphasizing Japanese Sovereignty
The Hesperia incident may be interpreted as a basic disagreement over the nature and 
extent of extraterritoriality in Japan, with the Japanese government deliberately challenging 
the existing international order and the mainstream, British-led consensus on its workings. 
Strong American support and the silence of the majority may have facilitated Japanese 
actions, which Great Britain and Germany considered deliberate provocations. The fact 
that the first foreign ship subjected to quarantine was German may have been coincidence. 
German newspapers criticized Eisendecher for his stupidity in having been used by Great 
Britain, which prudently did not take a publicly offensive step. The press hinted that the 
Hesperia already knew what it was facing upon embarkation at Kobe, when news of the 
quarantine of the Genkai maru arrived. The ship’s crew told passengers reluctant to board 
that the new quarantine regulations for Yokohama would not affect them as they were on a 
foreign vessel.
While Hesperia narratives in English frequently mentioned the threat the Hesperia 
posed to the population, Japanese writers emphasized the damage done to the nation at 
large. Meiji period accounts still pointed up the actual risk of introducing the epidemic to 
“a densely packed city of a million inhabitants,” and in 1881 Japanese writers boiled with 
“indignation” when discussing the “injustice” of “the limitation of the sovereign rights to 
which we as an independent nation are entitled.” Articles and books in Japanese routinely 
discussed the ship’s breaking quarantine, under such headings as “evil practices of consular 
jurisdiction” (ryōji saiban no heigai 領事裁判の弊害) or “examples of foreigners ignoring 
Japanese administrative regulations” (gaijin ga Nihon no gyōsei kisoku o mamoranai rei 外人
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が日本の行政規則を守らない例 ).136 The main postwar article in Japanese on the Hesperia 
incident analyzes it as part of the problem of the “unequal treaties.” Let us finally here 
explore the issue of extraterritoriality more closely.137 Extraterritoriality clauses had existed 
in Japan since 1858 and eventually covered relations with sixteen nations. These treaties, 
through their most-favored nation clause, provided for unilateral extraterritoriality, which 
meant that “treaty power foreigners” in Japan could only be sentenced by their own country’s 
officials according to their national laws.138
These international treaties usually failed to specify the particular institutions and 
laws according to which extraterritoriality was supposed to work. It was up to each nation 
to design its own system. Great Britain created and developed the most elaborate version, 
which included a court of appeals at Shanghai. Others, like the United States, France, and 
Germany maintained their own consular courts in Yokohama, even if they sometime had 
to borrow the British jail, or a Japanese prison. Many nations relied simply on the consular 
court services of other Western powers in Japan, so the presiding judge of the Danish 
Consular Court on one occasion could be the German, on another the British, consul. At 
the extreme end of indifference to the maintenance and exercise of extraterritorial privileges 
were those countries with few trading interests or people living in Japan. In such cases, 
the Japanese government simply renegotiated (as with Mexico in 1889), or it revoked their 
rights, as it did in 1892 without much protest. Contrary to popular perception, then and 
now, the majority of court cases in consular courts did not pit Japanese plaintiffs against 
foreign defendants; rather, they were civil law suits involving foreign litigants or petty police 
cases, dealing with drunken and disorderly sailors.139
So, did extraterritoriality mean that foreigners were at liberty to ignore Japanese law 
and regulation with impunity? In theory, of course, an offence or crime committed in Japan 
would be covered by foreign laws as well. Foreign powers often decided that really serious 
crimes requiring capital punishment were beyond the jurisdictional authority of consular 
courts in Japan, and needed to be adjudged by the courts of their home country such as 
Germany. Smaller felonies, however, were not always covered by foreign laws and sometimes 
cases had to be dismissed for simple lack of proper court jurisdiction or suitable laws, as in 
a documented case of fraud in the American consular court. Throughout the 1870s, the 
practical diplomatic custom had been that Japanese laws and regulations, especially regard-
ing common municipal affairs, became de facto binding after their adoption, sometimes 
with alterations, by the foreign consuls. So, consuls could in theory pick and choose which 
Japanese regulations they required their citizens to obey. When Japanese authorities wanted 
to devise regulations covering treaty port foreigners, they had to consult with the respective 
diplomats. Not all foreign residents agreed with this interpretation of extraterritoriality, and 
some challenged the consular practice of imposing Japanese laws on them. Japanese hunting 
regulations, for example, caused problems between the Japanese administration and gun-
carrying Westerners, even when the foreign diplomats agreed to enforce these rules in their 
consular courts.140 Again, revisions to the Japanese press law of June 1875 permitted only 
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Japanese subjects to own, edit and manage newspapers. In 1876, Sir Harry Parkes, at the 
request of the Japanese government, issued a regulation that prohibited British nationals 
from publishing Japanese newspapers and the American Minister Bingham most reluctantly 
followed this example. Accordingly, the recently-started Japanese language newspaper of the 
experienced journalist John R. Black, the Bankoku shinbun, was shut down which meant 
that, unlike Treaty Port China, a native language press outside the parameters of government 
censorship could not develop in Japan. After 1878, the British Foreign Office, over the 
objection of its Minister in Japan, decided to tell Japan informally that it would consider 
municipal law binding. By 1882, it had given official notification of this fact. Incorporation 
of Japanese municipal law into ministerial regulations, according to historian James Hoare, 
thereafter became an automatic process.141 The Hesperia incident fell into this transitional 
phase of British re-interpretation of its attitude towards municipal law and extraterritoriality.
During the late 1870s, Japanese intellectuals openly criticized the international treaties 
and their implementation in Japan even appealing to the home audiences of representatives 
of the foreign powers. One famous and influential case was that of the young Baba Tatsui 
馬場辰猪 (1850–88) who in 1876 published The Treaty between Japan and England, while 
studying law in England. Baba stressed “English people ought to obey the laws of our coun-
try as soon as they set their feet on our shore.” In particular, he criticized three elements of 
the treaties (1) legal extraterritoriality; (2) low and fixed tariffs; and (3) foreign interference 
in domestic affairs. He appealed to British “fair play” when he questioned the need for 
extraterritoriality:
Europeans who come to our country look upon the Japanese nation as a sort of quasi-
independent nation, and they make no scruple to violate the laws of our country 
because they have no fear of the government whose interest and duty it is to adequately 
punish the offenders. There have been some crimes committed by Englishmen, the 
nature of which is disgraceful even to describe; only recently a violent outrage was 
committed on a Japanese girl of thirteen, and this most shameful criminal act was 
punished in the Consular court with an imprisonment of six months… Of course it 
is open to us to bring our grievances before the Consular court, but these consuls … 
protect their countrymen rather than to prosecute or convict them.142
Besides the “anomaly” of extraterritoriality, the treaties also gave foreign merchants a 
business advantage over their Japanese partners who did not know English law. The treaties 
thus were “against the interest of progress and commerce in our country.” Free trade, said 
Baba, existed only in theory since the treaties cemented inequality in commercial relations. 
While the British were selling their manufactured goods to Japan benefitting from fixed 
and low tariffs, they set the import rate for Japanese merchandise such as tea and tobacco at 
staggering rates of between 50–70 and between 300–350 percent respectively.143 He drew 
his examples of foreign interference in domestic affairs from the world of commerce: foreign 
obstruction of silk worm egg certifications and banknote issues. Baba called the treaties 
“impassable obstacles to the equal and free intercourse between two independent nations,” 
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142 Baba 1987, p. 138.
143 Baba 1987, p. 152.
128
Harald FUESS
and expressed his emotions thus: “It is perfectly clear that no honorable nation will be 
contented with such indignities as these, and every Japanese will look upon these conces-
sions with the feeling of disgust and indignation.”144 While his language was exceptionally 
blunt, others shared his views, and the Japanese government at least tried to ameliorate the 
domestic effects of the international treaties and increase its room for maneuver without 
challenging the treaties outright or in principle.
Terashima Munenori, Japan’s Foreign Minister from October 1873, was one of the 
leading figures in the attempt to revise the international treaties. His main policy aim was 
to regain tariff autonomy for Japan, as well as strengthening the administrative role of the 
customhouse.145 His greatest achievement was a new customs treaty with the United States, 
which was an importer of tea and raw silk from Japan and had less to loose than exporting 
nations like Great Britain. The Yoshida-Everts convention concluded on 25 July 1878 was 
one of the key reasons why, in 1879, the United States was considered a friendly nation in 
Japan, and why the visit of General Grant was so widely celebrated.146
Contrary to common perceptions, Terashima may not have been entirely “passive” in 
his attempts to revise extraterritorial clauses in administrative affairs, and his two foreign 
legal advisors, the American Eli Sheppard (1842–1927) and the German Hermann Roesler 
(1834–94), wrote high-profile public defenses of his position in English and German. Eli 
Sheppard, advisor on international law from 1876 to 1880, publicly advocated a legal rein-
terpretation. A trained lawyer and former American consul to Tientsin, Sheppard was also 
an old friend of American Minister John Bingham, whom he had met during the American 
civil war; he later worked for Bingham’s law office. In 1879, Eli Sheppard published a series 
of twelve articles in the Japan Weekly Mail, which was also circulated as a book. His writing 
challenged the legal basis of Western extraterritoriality in municipal affairs.147 Explicitly 
rejecting the extraterritorial notion of “an imperium in imperio,” he referred to Bluntschli, 
Savigny and other respected scholars of international law of the time. Sheppard argued that 
any independent country commanded full sovereignty over its territory and all the people 
living in it, and without doubt deserved the full benefits “of Christian ethics embodied in 
the positive Law of Nations.”148 A country may through treaties delegate some of these rights 
to others, but Japan had never intended to relinquish them totally; legislative powers still 
remained with Japan. “Jurisdiction” as defined by the treaties could only mean that foreign 
consular courts were part of the Japanese judicative structure and should implement Japa-
nese not foreign law.149 Sheppard criticized the views of “Her Majesty’s Minister regarding 
the Quarantine Regulations of Japan” expressed in October 1878, and those written to him 
by the German Minister after the Hesperia incident, namely:150 “It could never have been 
intended by the extra-territorial clauses of either of the treaties to wholly exempt foreign 
subjects resorting to, or living in Japan for purposes of trade, from the municipal laws and 
regulations of the territorial government.”151 When the Hesperia incident erupted, those 
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involved understood it involved not only 
the concrete problem of preventing chol-
era; but also the larger issue of Japanese 
attempts to undermine extraterritoriality 
through a fait accompli. Eli Sheppard 
was the most visible foreign defender of 
the Japanese government’s legal position. 
Karl Friedrich Hermann Roesler 
had a strained relationship with the 
German government as he had lost his 
professorship in Germany due to his 
conversion to Catholicism. Aoki Shūzō 
青木周蔵 (1844–1914), the Japanese 
representative in Berlin, had hired him 
to be a legal advisor for the Japanese Foreign Ministry. This may have been the reason why 
he remained anonymous as the author of a “Letter from Japan” series in the leading German 
newspaper, the Allgemeine Zeitung. In an article of August 1879 he attacked foreign powers 
in Japan, explicitly the British position, and implicitly the German view, on quarantine.152 
Foreign powers wanted to subordinate (Mediatisierung) the Japanese government. When 
Japan concluded its international treaties, it had no intention to include administrative and 
police law, “which by their very nature are local in character and in which no independent 
government should accept the interference of foreign governments.” Defending the legal 
right of the Japanese government to cancel the existing treaties unilaterally, the article con-
tinued: “The foreign powers cannot rightfully and rationally claim a right that they would 
not recognize among each other and that has not the slightest justification in the existing 
law of nations (Völkerrecht).” The legal case was clear enough, it said; the power question 
alone remained. Britain disputed and in fact undermined Japanese commercial and indus-
trial autonomy as well as its sovereignty. With this rhetorical question, the article concluded: 
The British state’s desire to extend its supremacy in Asia to Japan is obvious enough, but it 
is difficult to comprehend why other powers, especially Germany, should be supportive of 
“British selfishness.”153 While it may be an exaggeration to argue that the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry engaged in a concerted international public relations campaign in late 1879, 
Japanese newspapers close to the government, like the Nichinichi shinbun, espoused what 
foreign newspapers then called the “sovereign rights theory.”
In contradistinction to the commonsense narrative of a Japan subjugated by a unified 
group of dominant Western powers, this study reveals a broader range of interests and beliefs 
within and among the participants of different nationalities. So far, consular juristiction and 
tariffs rates have usually taken center stage in the narrative of extraterritoriality and Japan. It 
is evident, however, that nineteenth century globalization brought not only black ships and 
a new international order to Japan, but previously unknown diseases such as cholera, and 
their sometimes conflicting Western counterpart, the latest scientific knowledge of medicine 
and public health. To protect the bodies of Japanese subjects, it was crucial to defend the 
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(sovereign) body of the nation—arguments proposed in the defense of Japanese action by 
Japanese and foreigners alike. 
Conclusion: Japan in the Western World Order
The Hesperia incident of 15 July 1879, involved a ship deliberately breaking Japanese mari-
time quarantine in Yokohama on the orders of the German government. The incident was a 
significant political conflict in international relations between Japan and the foreign powers, 
and reflected the power rivalry in Japan between the representatives of the United States 
and Europe. During the late 1870s, the Japanese government tried to challenge the existing 
treaties by a close scrutiny of the legal texts and their narrow interpretation, a position 
also advocated by its foreign legal advisors, and widely supported by the Japanese public. 
Maritime quarantine became one of the fields of lingering international contention as the 
Japanese government attempted to distance itself from an arrangement reached in 1873, by 
which the permission of foreign consuls was necessary to quarantine their ships. The desire 
for national independence in the protection of external borders and of Japan’s population 
was fuelled by the British Minister’s refusal to institute quarantine prior to the 1877 cholera 
epidemic, which in Japanese perception resulted in an unnecessary death toll. Thereafter, 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry tried to limit the voice of diplomatic representatives in the 
respective sanitary committees leading to the official withdrawal of the British representative 
in 1878. When Terashima Munenori, without wider consultation, insisted on a quarantine 
for the Hesperia that exceeded international standards he, according to the German Minister 
Eisendecher, then overtly challenged foreign jurisdiction over their ships without any 
medical necessity. The outcome of this perceived provocation was support by Great Britain 
and animosity from the United States. By September 1879, Terashima’s confrontational 
approach led to his isolation and dismissal from office. The Satsuma-born Terashima was 
succeeded by the more conciliatory and diplomatically suave Inoue Kaoru from Chōshū. 
Inoue served as Foreign Minister for eight years until September 1887. In his first draft 
proposal for a revised treaty, Inoue included the outright abolition of extraterritoriality and 
consular jurisdiction. Unlike the “passive aggressive” approach of Terashima, Inoue sought 
to reach an open, negotiated consensus through a series of multilateral conferences.
This study of Hesperia incident has also shown the emergence of a worldwide and 
transcultural public sphere of a reading public. Foreign diplomats exercised the power to 
overrule the wishes of the Japanese government, but at the cost of incurring Japanese and 
international wrath. Diplomats then responded by engaging with the powerful press. The 
Western-language press located in East Asia published in English or in French. Different 
newspapers competed in the treaty ports and partly maintained cooperation with Japanese 
newspapers. This press informed the local foreign resident community in Yokohama and 
Kobe, but also acted as a hub for news and the formation of public opinion on Japan in 
the United States and Europe. Together with the actions of Japanese government officials 
and their foreign advisors, the press served to ref lect the rights and duties of Western 
nations in their daily interactions with Japan. In the late 1870s, the Western press in East 
Asia served an important intermediary function. The rest of the world often referred to it 
as “the Japanese press” while the Japanese called it the “international press.” Sometimes 
denigrated as the uniform mouthpiece of a small ghettoized community of foreigners, the 
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treaty port press deserves to be reintegrated into Japanese history for the role it played in 
nation building in the first Meiji decade, and for projecting Japanese images and interests in 
a global context.
More than anything else, the Hesperia incident fuelled the public debate on national 
sovereignty and served to restrict, if not eliminate, extraterritoriality, which had formed the 
framework for political action, diplomatic negotiations and public discourse throughout the 
1870s. As all agreed, Japan was a sovereign state, but through international treaties it had 
waived specific rights, which under the regime of “international law” were the prerogatives 
of an independent nation. The conditions and circumstances under which it could retrieve 
those rights were not clearly defined. After the Iwakura mission abandoned the revision of 
the treaties due to the difficulty posed by the most-favored nation clause, the government 
accepted the international verdict that its administrative and legal institutions failed to 
conform to the standards of “civilized” countries. By the late 1870s, voices in multiple 
languages in and outside of Japan argued that Western countries abused the terms of the 
treaties by the very standards of international law to which diplomats so often referred. 
While diplomats still got away with their insistence that Japanese capabilities could not be 
trusted, they increasingly felt the pressure—not least on the home front—to take a more 
accommodating stance towards a rising nation.
The Hesperia’s transgression furthermore symbolized the violation of the Japanese 
nation to the medical community. Containing contagious diseases in early Meiji Japan 
constituted a highly political act, transcending the realm of specialized medical philosophies 
and therapeutic practices. The issue of cholera was used by Japanese and foreign doctors to 
combat “foreign” diseases, and to hold invasive foreigners at bay. Domestically they rallied 
the nation and intruded into the private lives of Japanese communities and families. The 
mantra of “quarantine the healthy, isolate the sick, disinfect them and burn everything else 
touched by disease” required and encouraged strong and effective bureaucratic and logistical 
capabilities, and the regulation and overruling of personal desires. In 1877 when the state 
told its armed forces, returning victorious from the battlefields of Kyushu, to remain on 
their cholera-infected ships, the “soldiers, disregarding the directions of the officers, to 
remain on board … landed forcibly, brandishing their swords and muskets, and threatening 
to revolt. ...the disease commenced to spread over Kobe, Hiogo, Osaka and Kioto.”154
As we have seen, the Japanese measures for enforcing a stringent quarantine on foreign 
shipping in the 1870s went hand in hand with the global enhancement of the powers of the 
nation state, and the rise of economic protectionism. It was only later, after 1884, that these 
measures found their scientific justification through bacteriological research. The political 
acceptance and support in Japan for at least some national seclusion was widespread, and 
even foreign newspapers called for open ports in Japan to close temporarily. A rather long 
duration of one week quarantine by international standards of twenty four hours was 
supported by a strong belief in the necessity of protecting Japanese people and asserting 
national sovereignty. Maritime quarantine also became a tool in its own empire-building 
efforts, when Japan applied it in a strict way to consolidate its colonial borders and ports 
154 Nagayo 1877, p. 17.
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such as Pusan in Korea.155 In China, by contrast, the imposition of maritime quarantine was 
widely resisted into the early twentieth century, partly because the state appeared ineffective in 
its implementation, but more because the Chinese associated the system with the infringe-
ment of their dignity and sovereignty by treaty port foreigners.156
Instead of a full scale revision, the Japanese Foreign Ministry under Terashima 
Munenori in the 1870s focused on two specific issues. The first was tariff revision. It 
appeared more urgent than ever with the balance of trade turning against Japan in that 
decade, when the value of its imports exceeded its foreign revenues through the export of 
silk and tea, raising the artificially low tariff rates. The 1878 treaty convention with the 
United States, although never implemented—it stipulated that all the other powers needed 
also agree to a change in the tariff system—provided a milestone of Japanese diplomatic 
success. Other states, Great Britain in particular, continued to adhere to the ideology of free 
trade with low tariffs, and their economic stakes in import trade were higher. In the end, 
the tariff system remained in place beyond the extinction of extraterritoriality until 1911. 
The second issue proved to be more contentious, but more effective. The government, 
its foreign advisors and the press started to insist on a narrow reading of treaty stipulations. 
Japanese sovereignty, they said, applied unless explicitly restricted by a clause in the treaty. 
Administrative, municipal or police regulations they did not consider to be part of the “law” 
as defined by the treaties and thus did not need to be enforced by consular courts. Foreign 
diplomats resented this approach as it questioned their own claims for legitimacy. British 
Minister Sir Harry Parkes interpreted Japanese policies restricting hunting, prohibiting the 
import of medicinal opium or institutionalizing independent quarantine as infringements 
on the treaty rights of British nationals, which he was “duty-bound to protect.” Quarantine 
to him was an infringement of individual liberty and free trade. He, like some local 
Western newspapers, feared that extending to the Japanese state the uncontrollable right 
of administration over the foreign community would lead to abusive and arbitrary acts, 
and even drive them out of Japan. The Hesperia controversy in regards to a broader denial 
of the validity of administrative regulations was almost his last stand on this issue. The 
British Law Lords, the highest appellate court in the land, ruled in a landmark case of 31 
December 1878 that “Japanese municipal law should prevail except where inconsistent with 
treaty rights.”157
The Hesperia incident also shows unity among the leading treaty powers in their desire 
to maintain the legal framework of informal imperialism. They may have disagreed on trade 
and tariffs, municipal and police regulations, medical philosophies and practices, but in 
1879 they all wanted to maintain the system of consular jurisdiction and extraterritoriality. 
With the advent of Inoue Kaoru as Foreign Minister, the Japanese government took a more 
conciliatory and multilateral approach on treaty revision, resulting in two major rounds 
of conferences in the 1880s. The feud between the Americans on one side and the British-
led Europeans on the other endured for several years. What most visibly changed was 
the attitude of German Minister Eisendecher on the issue of the rights of foreigners in 
Japan. With the cooperative approach of the new Foreign Minister, Eisendecher became a 
conciliatory negotiator in the treaty revision process. In the end, Inoue’s approach also failed 
155 Kim 2013.
156 Benedict 1996, pp. 150–53.
157 TNA, F.O. 46/238.
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to accomplish revision. When the wider public learned about the secret arrangements the 
government had made with foreign powers, it considered the compromise an infringement 
on Japanese sovereignty, and rallied to push for full national independence and the end of 
informal empire.
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